The vast majority of “dual codes” Mauser-Berlin assembled were based upon Astrawerke made receivers coded “bcd”, which represents Gustloff-Werke’s operation at Weimar. They range in dates from 1941 through 1943, though all seem to have been made in 1942 and 1943. These receivers are far more complicated to date than the ERMA “dual codes”, which all fall in a narrow window of production. Apparently Mauser-Berlin took delivery of the first receivers very early in 1942, you see them showing up in the middle of the first block of 1942 production and increase in number through the early blocks of Mauser-Berlin production. Actually, this type of receiver represents the majority of rifles assembled in some blocks. It is far easier to find a bcd/ar 42 in the “b” through “g” blocks than a straight up ar/42 in those blocks. These seem to end in the 1942 g-block, at least for a time, only to show up again in smaller numbers in 1943. During 1943 the bcd/ar 43 dual codes are much rarer, but show up in almost every block between the a-block and j-block (they show up in the b-block through g-block, at least one is known in each block, plus one i-block is also known). Most interesting are the receivers that are not actually “dual” coded, there are several Mauser-Berlin assembled bcd/43 without the added “ar” in the last blocks, the g-block and i-block, which shows that they dispensed with this added feature near the end. The bcd/ar 42’s and bcd/ar 43’s are trickier to date, obviously, the 1943 dated were assembled in 1943, the barrel codes on enough of them prove this, but as the acceptance and serial patterns are nearly identical between 1942 and 1943 production, you really need to see the barrel code to know when a rifle was probably made.
Recently, a question was raised about Mauser-Berlin’s production of the so called “dual coded” rifles, that began in late 1941 and ended in 1943, – the same year Mauser-Berlin dropped carbine (Kar.98k) production to focus on MG42 production.
I thought this would be a good subject for discussion, so examination of known examples follow. It seems that Mauser-Berlin took delivery of leftover ERMA (ax code) receivers late in 1941, when they dropped rifle assembly to focus on MP40 production (They would continue making 98k receivers, though primarily as a sub-contractor for JP Sauer). The first rifles show up in the “L” block of 1941; however it is the “M” block when most show up, mostly late in the block and very near the end of 1941 production. They linger into the first block of 1942 production (no suffix).
Most ax-ar coded rifles were probably made at the very end of Mauser-Berlin’s 1941 production run; though it is likely many were not finished until early 1942. This is because of the characteristics found on the known rifles. First, Mauser-Berlin production serialed both the receiver and the barrel until very late in 1941, typically this changed in the last block of Mauser-Berlin production, the m-block. In that block you will start to see the rationalization changes, ordered by Hitler and imposed upon the German military, to simplify production. This process is best shown in rifle production with a reduction of markings and finish standards that you will see on late 1941 and throughout 1942 production, – it also accounts for the reason ERMA, and later Mauser-Berlin, would be redirected to other projects, and away from rifle production.
The Germans never envisioned Locarno (1925) as a solution to Versailles or as a suitable restoration of her rights among nations. At best it was viewed as a means to an end, the first step towards normalization with the west, with the eventual settlement to be reached in Eastern Europe (it intentionally left out any border guarantees in the east with Poland or the Czechs).
To illustrate the view of the military prior to the rise of National Socialism, which was a viewed shared by a large percentage of the political parties (no party looked towards Poland’s frontier as permanent), all one has to do is look at the rearmament plans the Army began, first September 1928 through 1932, which was designed to modernize the defensive capabilities of the German Army. This was followed by Schleicher’s more ambitious plan of November 1932 to expand the Army (actual spending of which occurred under Hitler, – his initial rearmament funds, and plans, came from his predecessor).
With the expectation that war was an eventuality in the east, if not from German aggression seeking restoration, then from aggression from Poland seeking status quo (a real possibility as 1933 proved), the German Army put much of its effort into being prepared on its eastern frontier. One such example was the German Army asking Mauser Oberndorf to investigate the possibilities of converting Nagant 91 and Steyr M95 rifles to the German 7.92 mm cartridge. It was envisioned that in a future conflict it was likely many would be captured and these rifles could be put to use in support and police functions in the German Army.
Recently there was a discussion on the German contract rifles delivered to Turkey during 1917 and 1918; with the help of Jon Speed we have much more information about the circumstances of this contract and delivery.
When the war expanded with the Turkey’s entry into the war on Germany’s side, Turkey was isolated, along with Bulgaria, from her allies by Serbia and Rumania, which was neutral until August 1916. This caused enormous logistical problems for the Central Powers, both Bulgaria and Turkey were heavily dependant upon supplies from Germany, especially critical was ammunition. While Rumania had strong economic ties to Germany and some things in common with A-H, she increasingly became hostile to the Central Powers due to British and French intrigue. While trade with Germany never ended prior to August 1916, the transit of supplies from Germany and Austria to Bulgaria and Turkey had been repeatedly disrupted and hampered.